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Jury Service and Challenges for Cause in Missouri, com-
pletes a series of two articles on this subject, the first hav-
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SAMUEL BRECKENRIDGE NOTE PRIZE AWARD
Caspar R. Stauffacher's note on Statutory Presumptions of
Guilt has been awarded the fifteen dollar prize as the best note
in the second issue of the current volume.
Notes
FRANCHISE TAXES OF CORPOR4TIONS HAVING STOCK
WITHOUT PAR VALUE
The traditional organization of a corporation formed to en-
gage in business is based on par value stock, i. e., shares in the
business for which a certain amount stated in the shares is sub-
scribed. But for various reasons, including the variation in
market values of stocks so that par does not correspond to the
market prices, but often misleads persons as to stock value, most
of the states have passed laws allowing corporations to organ-
ize without stating par value on the stock certificates. The in-
troduction of no par stock raises certain problems as to the man-
ner in which it shall be treated. Among these is the question of
taxation.
It has been traditional to distinguish between property taxes
and franchise taxes upon corporations.' Franchises are special
privileges which are conferred by the government upon indi-
'2 Cooley, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) sees. 799, 826-38; Hilliard, LAW OF
TAXATION (1875) 20, 207, 209.
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viduals and which do not belong to the citizens of common right.2
Franchise taxes upon corporations are levied in consideration
of, or as a prerequisite to, the extraordinary privilege of doing
business in a corporate manner, which is a privilege conferred
by the state and not a right such as the pursuing of ordinary
lawful occupations by private persons. Property taxes are
those ordinary taxes levied for the support of the state upon all
property owners, or upon certain classes, e. g. landowners. Cor-
porations are clearly subject to taxation of their property to the
same extent as individuals,4 and shares of corporate stock may
be taxed in the hands of individuals.
A convenient method of assessing franchise taxes uopn cor-
porations was to evaluate the franchise by assuming it was
worth the par value of the stock and calculating the tax accord-
ingly. But when no par stock was introduced, the tax obviously
could not be levied in this way. How then could the shares be
fairly and quickly assessed and a tax levied which would not
give rise to great litigation?
The different states through their legislatures have met this
problem in different ways. Mr. Wickersham has distinguished
four methods of imposing the tax: r (1) the imposition for pur-
poses of taxation of a fictitious value or par value, usually
$100.00 per share;6 (2) the employment of a presumption that
the stock is worth $100.00 per share in the absence of a showing
that it is of different value; 7 (3) taxation according to the num-
ber of shares; 8 (4) taxation based upon the consideration for
the shares received by the corporation from its stockholders.0
The first method might be combined with the third since the
amount of the tax in each instance is determined by the number
of shares and not by their value. The fourth method is not
greatly different, except that the amount of the tax may vary
from corporation to corporation. But the second method is quite
distinct, being based on the actual value of the stock, once it is
determined.
In the application of the tax the question arises as to whether
corporations of other states, commonly called foreign corpora-
tions, may be taxed equally with or to a greater extent than cor-
porations originally incorporated in the state, referred to as
domestic corporations. The original doctrine was that a state
22 Morawetz, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (2d ed. 1886) sec. 922.
'Allgeyer v. Louisiana (1897) 165 U. S. 578, 589.
' Cooley, op. cit. sec. 818; Morawetz, op. cit. sec. 1085.
Wickersham, STOCK WITHOUT PAR VALUE (1927) sec. 71.
'Ibid., where the author cites Col., Conn., Ill., La., Md., Minn., Mo., N. H.,
N. C., Ore., Pa., R. I., Tenn., Utah, Vt., Va., W. Va.
7Ibid., citing Ala., Kan., N. M.
'Ibid., giving Me., Mass., Nev., N. Y., Ohio, Wis. 'Ibid., citing Texas.
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might exclude foreign corporations from its territory altogether
and, as a condition of permitting them to do business within the
state, might impose any tax or obligation it chose.' 0 However,
a doctrine has grown up that a state may not impose an uncon-
stitutional condition upon a foreign corporation as the price of
its license to do business within its borders."
Since the authority to issue stock not yet issued is one of the
privileges granted by the incorporating state alone, a tax by a
foreign state on authorized stock may be subject to greater
criticism than a tax regulated by the amount or value of out-
standing stock. In Air Way Electric Corporatio v. Day"- a
Delaware corporation had issued one-eighth of its authorized
no par shares. It was located in Ohio where it did 28 per cent
of its business. Ohio levied an annual fee on foreign corpora-
tions of "five cents per share on the proportion of the number
of shares of authorized common stock represented by property
• . . and business . . . in this state." This was a tax of an
arbitrary amount on each share authorized. The court held that
the tax violated the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution,
Art. 1, sec. 8, § 3, since all the foreign corporation's business and
property were represented by the issued shares, and a tax on all
the shares authorized, or on a greater number than those out-
standing, amounted to a tax and burden on all the property and
business, including interstate commerce. "The number of shares
not subscribed or issued has no relation to the privilege held by
plaintiff in Ohio, and is not a reasonable measure of such a
fee." -' The fee had no relation to what was paid in for the stock
or to its value or capital, its property or business. The classifi-
cation was held to be unequal in its results, not requiring like
fees for equal privileges, and to have no relation to the purpose
for which it was made. Hence the act violated the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The above reasoning admits that a tax on issued shares is
valid, whether by the parent or a foreign state. And it de-
nounces a tax by a foreign state on shares authorized but not
issued. As to whether the parent state itself may tax the cor-
poration by the measure of authorized stock without regard to
actual issuance we turn to the later case of Roberts and Schafer
v. Em merson . 4 Here the domestic corporation issued the full
amount of authorized no par shares at $5.00 per share. The an-
nual tax was figured so that "for the purpose of fixing the fee,
' Horn Silver Mining Co. v. N. Y. (1891) 143 U. S. 305; (1927) 25 MICH.
L. REv. 278.
" Henderson, THE POSITION OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW (1918) ch. 7; Western Union Tel. Co. v Kan. (1895) 216
U. S. 1. - (1924) 266 U. S. 71.
" Ibid. 83. 1 (1926) 271 U. S. 50, 45 A. L. R. 1495.
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no par shares shall be considered to be of the par value of
$100.00 per share," and the tax was to be on the authorized
shares. The tax was attacked on the ground that corporations
of equal worth but of different authority to issue shares would
be taxed unequally, the corporation claiming such difference to
be a violation of the equal protection clause. The court dis-
tinguishes the Air Way case as holding that "the authority to
issue its capital stock was a privilege conferred by another State
and bore no relation to any franchise granted to it by the State
of Ohio or to its business and property within that state"1 and
that a tax on authorized capital stock may not be levied on a
foreign corporation, as this results in unconstitutional discrimi-
nation. But a tax on authorized capital stock is legal as a fran-
chise tax on a domestic corporation.-6
As shown above in the Air Way case, the question of such
taxes interfering with interstate commerce frequently arises.
It has been decided that a tax is unconstitutional if it is meas-
ured by the whole issued capital stock of a foreign corporation
without regard to the assets in the state, or their proportion to
the whole assets.1 But when the tax is on a proportion of out-
standing capital stock determined by the value of the property
in the jurisdiction, the tax is valid whether on the property or
15Ibid. 54.
"Ibid. 54; Kansas City Ry. v. Kansas (1915) 240 U. S. 227, 232-3; Kansas
City v. Stiles (1916) 242 U. S. 111.
IT Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle (1929) 278 U. S. 460, commented on in
(1929) 42 HAuv. L. REv. 952. It was thought that an exception had been
developed by the Baltic case where the tax on the whole authorized par stock
of a foreign corporation but limited to a specified sum ($2000), was held
valid as not taxing property in other states nor constituting a burden upon
interstate commerce. Baltic Mining Co. v. Mass. (1913) 231 U. S. 68, at
87, disapproved by Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Mass. (1924) 268 U. S.
203, 44 A. L. R. 1219. The court was of the opinion that the measure of this
privilege tax was allowable, the taxation of such a privilege being in itself
lawful. When the maximum was removed, the tax became unconstitutional.
International Paper Co. v. Mass. (1917) 246 U. S. 135. This point was re-
vived in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle (D. C. Wash. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 124,
where the District Court held valid a tax on both foreign and domestic
corporations measured by the entire authorized capital stock but limited to
$3000. A foreign corporation doing some intrastate business but a much
greater amount of interstate business was subjected to the tax, which was
found to be reasonable and to bear a reasonable relation to the amount of
intrastate business done. This case was reversed on appeal, the Supreme
Court disallowing any exception to the general rule of non-discrimination
against foreign corporations. Even a relatively small tax may not be sus-
tained if it really burdens interstate commerce and reaches property beyond
the state. The amount is unimportant when there is no legitimate basis for
the tax.
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imposed as a franchise tax.18 The state has authority to tax the
paid-up issued stock of domestic corporations for the privilege
of incorporation, and the fact that some capital stock represents
capital in other states or in interstate commerce, not subject to
the taxing power of the state, does not render the tax invalid.19
Having dealt with the relation of franchise taxation to inter-
ference with interstate commerce, we may go directly to the
question of valuation of no par stock for purposes of taxation.
The most common method of levying the tax is to disregard
actual worth and either to set a fictitious value on each share or
to measure the tax by the number of shares, with similar results.
The fictitious value usually is higher than the actual value.
Consequently taxes based upon such values are opposed upon the
ground that they deny the equal protection of the laws, because
par stock corporations are taxed on par value which frequently
is less than the market value, while no par stock corporations
are assessed on the higher fictitious value. Where state con-
stitutions provide that taxation must be equal, an additional
ground of invalidity can be asserted.
State courts have not always held the tax allowable. In Peo-
ple ex rel. Terminal and Town Taxi Corporation v. Walsho2 the
provision that shares be deemed to have a face value of $100.00
each for the purpose of assessing the tax was held unconstitu-
tional because it was entirely arbitrary and necessarily resulted
in unequal taxation. The court followed a former New York
case, People ex rel. Forrington v. Mensching,2 1 holding in effect
that the corporation tax must be measured by face or actual
value, which it seemed to regard as the same, and that all other
methods resulting unequally would be unconstitutional and void.
The effect of the case was partially overcome by the same court
in People ex rel. Griffith v. Loughman.22 A license fee on foreign
corporations of six cents on each issued no par share employed
in the state was held valid as a premium for entering the state,
but its application to corporations already in the state was de-
nied. But it has been held that a foreign corporation may attack
a discriminatory statute existing at the time of its admission. 23
It is conjectured that the New .York court was merely taking a
half-way position before giving the tax full application. The
law was later fully upheld by the Supreme Court of the
United States.24
Hump Hairpin Co. v. Emmerson (1922) 258 U. S. 290.
Kansas City Ry. v. Kansas (1916) 240 U. S. 227.
(1922) 202 App. Div. 651, 195 N. Y. S. 184.
(1907) 187 N. Y. 8, 79 N. E. 884.
(1928) 249 N. Y. 369, 164 N. E. 253.
Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunder (1927) 274 U. S. 490, and case comment in
(1927) 41 HARv. L. REV. 95. 'Note 35, below.
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The Arkansas court did not restrict the operation of a similar
tax on foreign corporations to subsequent incorporators. In
State v. Margay Oil CorporatioU26 it held that the effect of the
statute was simply to provide a definite method for fixing the
franchise tax; that separating par and no par corporations was a
reasonable classification; and that the 'corporation, having
chosen the no par method by its voluntary act, could not com-
plain that other corporations with the same amount of assets
were taxed differently.
Massachusetts in 1921 held that a statute taxing no par stock
as having a par value of $100.00 was valid.26 It seemed as fair
for these corporations to pay a tax on such amounts as for a
corporation with depreciated par stock to pay tax on par. The
state might put an arbitrary value on the privilege of doing busi-
ness in the state.
Of course the highest authority on constitutionality is the
Supreme Court of the United States. In the Air Way case,
27
the corporation had contended that the basis of taxation must
reflect the value of the privilege.28 The court agreed that some
relation to such value is a reasonable requirement and stated
obiter that "the number of non par value shares of the corpora-
tion is not an indication of, and does not purport to be a repre-
sentation of the amount of its capital. Each outstanding share
represents merely an aliquot part of its assets." On the basis of
this dictum Mr. Wickersham concluded that any tax not on
actual value is unconstitutional.
29
In the Schaefero case, however, the court took up the question
of whether there are such differences between par and no par
stock as to constitute a proper basis for classification for taxa-
tion of corporate franchises, so that the amount of tax on par
stock may be based on par and in the case of no par upon the
arbitrary value fixed in the statute. The court held that the dif-
ference is substantial, and, therefore, the classification is not
discriminatory or unreasonable. The nature of these differences
is indicated: no par stock may be issued from time to time at
different prices or values, although holders of all shares are en-
(1925) 167 Ark. 614, 269 S. W. 63, aff'd (1926) 273 U. S. 666, note 34,
below.
American Uniform Co. v. Commonwealth (1921) 237 Mass. 42, 129 N. E.
622. The Michigan Court in Detroit Manufacturing Corp. v. Sec. of State
(1920) 211 Mich. 320, 178 N. W. 697, 182 N. W. 528, applied such a clause
in the Delaware law to a Delaware corporation in Michigan for the purpose
of assessing the stock in Michigan without questioning its constitutionality.
' Note 12, above.
's Looney v. Crane (1917) 245 U. S. 178; Internat'l Paper Co. v. Mass.
(1917) 246 U. S. 135.
' Wickersham, op. cit. 167. ' See note 14, above.
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titled to share equally in the distribution of profits; thus, greater
ease and facility is permitted in issue and marketing of shares
in no par stock. After laying this sound legal basis, the court
says that a difference in tax is unavoidable in taxing authorized
stock, for some value must be assigned although shares are is-
sued from time to time at varying prices, and until issued can
have no value. The court concludes the discussion: "The in-
equalities complained of result from a classification which, being
founded upon real differences, is not unreasonable, and the dis-
crimination which results from it is not arbitrary or prohibited
by the Fourteenth Amendment. It is enough that the classifica-
tion is reasonably founded upon or related to some permissible
policy of taxation." 1
This case puzzles Mr. Wickersham who had concluded from
the Air Way case and the Wadh case that setting up such arbi-
trary values for taxation was unconstitutional.2- He attempts to
distinguish it on the ground that the tax was on authorized
stock:
Even if the Schaefer case is to become settled law, how-
ever, the distinction between a tax on authorized stock and
a tax on outstanding stock must be borne in mind. The
former is clearly one on the privilege of issuing stock only.
It [the tax] must often be paid long before the stock is is-
sued and irrespective of actual issuance. But a tax on out-
standing stock is one on that part only of the privilege which
has been exercised. The issued and outstanding stock rep-
resents the property of the corporation, and a tax on or
measured by such stock is essentially one on or measured
by the amount of the property. Hence, where a fictitious
value is placed upon it for tax purposes, there is a resulting
discrimination which is very direct and real, emphasizing
the unfairness and resulting discrimination. These con-
siderations might lead the same court to reach different
conclusions where the tax is on the outstanding rather than
the authorized stock. 3
Mr. Wickersham says that the decision is disappointing in that
it fails to give full effect to the obvious discrimination within
the class, that it overlooks the fact that other states have solved
the difficulty without discrimination. He disapproves of the
case and says it can be supported only on the "slender thread"
that there is "value in the mere authority to issue no par stock
which varies with the amount authorized, whether the shares
Ident. 57; Watson v. State Comptroller (1922) 254 U. S. 122.
Wickersham, op. cit. 137, 155-6.
"Ideni. 141.
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are issued or not." He raises the query "whether it [the tax]
is valid if it is based on the outstanding stock," with a clear inti-
mation that it should not be.
Thus, the position of the courts was subjected to doubt. How-
ever, in 1926 the Supreme Court in two per curiam decisions 34
sustained the Arkansas franchise tax on foreign corporations.
The tax was figured by determining the ratio of property and
business in Arkansas to the whole property and taxing the same
proportion of issued and outstanding shares at $25.00 per share
valuation. One case affirmed the Arkansas decision in the
Margay Oil Corporation case commented on above. The court
based its decision on the authority of the Schaefer case, thus ex-
tending it to foreign corporations and issued stock. A discus-
sion of the principles involved, however, was not forthcoming
until May 13, 1929, when the Court decided two cases which
seem to settle the matter. The viewpoint of the Schaefer case
was taken and taxes based on an arbitrary figure applied to the
issued capital stock were upheld for both domestic and foreign
no par value corporations. It will be valuable to analyze these
cases.
In People of State of New York v. Latrobe-' the New York
law imposing a license fee on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the state, based on that proportion of its total capital
stock which its gross assets employed within the state bear to
its total assets, was upheld.36 In case of stock having no par
value the fee was fixed at six cents per share, whereas par value
stock was taxed at one-eighth of one per cent of par value. The
state's claim for unpaid taxes, filed in the bankruptcy of the
Thermiodyne Radio Corporation, incorporated in Delaware,
though expunged in District Court and the Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, was allowed by the Supreme Court. The tax was called a
license fee and paid but once, for the privilege of exercising cor-
porate privileges in the state. 250,000 shares of the bankrupt
corporation had been issued at $2.32 per share, but the assets
were only about $1.12 per share, all located in New York. The
tax of six cents per share amounted to $15,000, the same amount
that would have been levied on a corporation with $12,000,000
of par-value stock. The stock here had been sold for but
$580,000. The state's claim was attacked on the ground that the
arbitrariness of the amount infringed the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court rejected the conten-
U Margay Oil Corporation v. Applegate (1926) 273 U. S. 666, note 25,
above; Gilliland Oil Corp. v. Arkansas (1926) 274 U. S. 717.
(1929) 279 U. S. 421.
Cahill's Consol. Laws N. Y. (1923) c. 61, sec. 181; Griffith v. Loughman
(1928) 249 N. Y. 369, 164 N. E. 253, note 22, above.
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tion, limiting the Air Way case to taxes on authorized share of a
foreign corporation. It pointed out that in taxation of par value
stock the objection that the tax is not on the actual value, but
often is based on something far different, i. e., par, has not been
held to invalidate such taxes. Moreover "the kind and number
of shares with which a foreign corporation is permitted to carry
on its business within the state is a part of the privilege which
the state extends to it, and is a proper element to be taken in
fixing a tax on the privilege." Hence the tax is "reasonably re-
lated to the privilege granted by the state and to the protection
of its similar policy of taxation with respect to domestic corpora-
tions, and so does not infringe any constitutional immunity."
The court lastly brings out "the difference in the rights of credi-
tors of the two classes of corporations" as a basis for differen-
tiating them and taxing par and no par differently; in the case
of no par stock difficulties arise in the enforcement by creditors
of the liability of stockholders for unpaid subscriptions, or of
the directors for improper diversion of capital.
Companion to this case is International Shoe Co. v. Shartel.3 7
Plaintiff, a Delaware corporation doing business within the state
of Missouri, prayed for an injunction to restrain the officials of
the state of Missouri from collecting a franchise tax levied under
two state statutes providing, (1) that a tax of one-twentieth of
one per cent of the par value of capital stock and surplus em-
ployed in business in the state shall be collected, the proportion
of capital stock and surplus so employed to be determined by the
proportion that the corporation's assets in the state bear to the
total assets wherever located, and (2) that for the purpose of
computing such tax each share of stock without any nominal or
par value, shall be considered the equivalent of a share having a
par value of one hundred dollars. It was held (1) that such a
tax is not an unlawful regulation of interstate commerce and isjustified as a tax on the privilege of exercising the corporation's
franchises within the state, and (2) that such tax is not a tak-
ing of property without due process of law nor a denial of equal
protection of the laws. The assignment to shares of a value in
excess of their present worth does not operate to tax property
outside the state, according to the Court, because the tax "is a
privilege tax and not a property tax." And the provisions of the
tax in the principal case apply equally to domestic and foreign
corporations. The issued stock is a measure of the privilege
exercised. Thus, the court clearly considered all taxes paid by
corporations because they are corporations, as franchise taxes,
not property taxes. Despite Mr. Wickersham's logic,38 no dis-
tinction is in fact made.
(1929) 279 U. S. 429; (1929) 77 U. PA. L. REV. 817-19.
Note 33, above.
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The cases treat the corporation franchise tax as a privilege
tax or as a condition for doing business as a corporation within
the state, whether the corporation be domestic or foreign. The
tax need have no relation to the property held nor to the business
done nor to the value of the stock or the amount paid for it. Only
some relation to the privilege granted or exercised must be
shown to render the tax constitutional.- And the relation of
the tax to the privilege, required for equal protection, need not
be to the value of the privilege; for the franchise is not assessed
or evaluated as by a business man. As regards classification of
corporations, it is sufficient if legal distinctions 40 are made,
based, for example, upon freedom in fixing the price of the stock
with the attendant ease and facility in its issue and marketing.
The result of these cases seems clear. Taxes on the number
of shares or based on an arbitrary valuation are constitutional
under the equal protection clause, on either authorized or issued
stock of domestic corporations, and on the issued stock of foreign
corporations. Only the authorized stock not yet issued by for-
eign corporations is exempt, partly because of the operation of
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. But the con-
stitutionality of the taxes does not imply fairness or expediency
which now become the main questions for the tax making bodies.
The unequal results of a fixed method regardless of actual value
have been pointed out, so arbitrary value or tax on the number
of shares have been disapproved. And the Latrobe case observed
that even taxation on par or the consideration received brought
some serious discrepancies. This leaves us with the possibility
of Mr. Wickersham's second method of those that have been
tried, that of taxing according to a fixed value until the actual
value is shown. The expense of collecting the tax is an element
in determining expediency. Assessing is more expensive than
an arbitrary method, and it is difficult to determine the value of
the property or franchise of a large corporation. This hindrance
is alleviated by causing the overtaxed corporation to present to
the court a schedule of assets before the assessment may be
changed. The practical difficulties have weight, but should not
overweigh the consideration of what is fair and equitable.
ROBERT J. HARDING, '30.
DETERMINING PROFITS OF FIRE INSURANCE COM-
PANIES FOR RATE REGULATION
Administrative control over the rates and premiums of in-
surers is a recent development. The people, having brought the
"Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas (1909) 217 U. S. 114 at 126.
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania (1928) 277 U. S. 389; (1929) 27
MIcH. L. REV. 800.
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